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Using evidence from English and Scottish fire and rescue services from 2010 to 2016, this 
paper shows how divergent performance management regimes can affect public accountability. 
Performance management regimes enable agencies and the public to hold public sector 
organizations accountable by facilitating evaluation of their accomplishments. However, local 
as opposed to central, control over performance management can have quite different 
implications for public accountability.  
 
IMPACT 
The findings reported in this paper make it possible for public sector policy makers and 
managers, to reflect upon policies that shape whether or not performance measurement regimes 
enable them to remain accountable to the communities they serve. On one hand, localism 
policies can lead to deficits in accountability. On the other, policies that focus on centralized 








Despite dramatic reductions in public spending since 2010, UK fire and rescue services (FRSs) 
have been required to maintain their resilience and response to local emergencies. The Grenfell 
Tower fire in London in 2017 exposed the importance of a fully resourced, well-performing 
but also accountable fire service.  
 
By setting standards and facilitating the assessment of what public services have accomplished, 
performance management regimes enable public sector organizations to be held accountable 
(Behn, 2003). In this sense, such regimes are instrumental to the establishment of legitimate 
accountability mechanisms (Moynihan et al., 2011). This paper shows how the performance 
management regimes of fire and rescue services in England and Scotland have diverged since 
2010, having had common antecedents over the previous 200 years (Ewen, 2010; Murphy and 
Greenhalgh, 2018). Recent audit reports (Audit Scotland, 2015; NAO, 2015) have highlighted 
significant differences in the governance, performance management and policy response to the 
current era of austerity in each country. In an era of austerity, such differences have formed 
part of wider public sector reforms in each country (Audit Scotland, 2015; NAO, 2015). 
Austerity-localism (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012) has featured heavily in England, as opposed 
to more centralized control over delivery and governance in Scotland.  
 
Importantly, we show how these divergent performance management regimes can have 
differing implications for how the public and other agencies can be assured that public services 
(including fire and rescue) remain accountable to the communities they serve. Our main 
argument in this paper is that public sector reforms in the UK fire services have had a 
fundamental impact on their performance management regimes and, thus, how the services 
account for their performance. As such, our work contributes to ongoing debates about what 
constitutes effective public sector accountability and the important role of performance 
management regimes in assuring that accountability (for example see Dubnick, 2005; 
Eckersley et al., 2014).  
 
Our paper contributes a comparative perspective to limited prior literature in the area of fire 
and rescue—a relatively under-researched area of the public sector (Carvalho et al., 2006, 
2008; Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2013; Pileman et al, 2014; Kloot, 2009; Launder and Perry, 
2014; Taylor et al., 2017). This approach has enabled us to highlight how differing levels of 
bureaucratic control (i.e. local versus central) over the management of performance 
management regimes, can affect public accountability. In a similar sense, the findings may be 
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of practical relevance to other jurisdictions seeking to understand what such control over their 
own performance management regimes may imply for their ability to deliver public services 
with improved accountability. It will also be of general relevance to organizations seeking to 
implement strategies, as it highlights the benefits of a golden thread or ‘consistent cascading 
process’ (Micheli & Neely, 2010) to enable the alignment of organizational subdivisions with 
the corporate centre (Kaplan and Norton 2006).  
  
Literature review 
Accountability and performance management regimes 
The accountability literature is diverse cutting across the disciplines of accounting, public 
management and administration, public policy, politics and economics. The concept defies 
concrete definition and is widely regarded as multifaceted, beset with complexity and 
chameleon-like (Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995). Accountability is broadly about conduct and 
the giving and demanding of reasons (or accounts) for conduct (Roberts and Scapens, 1985; 
Messner, 2009). Its key purpose in democratic societies is to ensure citizens can maintain 
democratic control, control the exercise of power, and so that agents held to account know that 
they are expected to reach and maintain certain standards (Bovens, 2005; Aucoin and 
Heintzman, 2000). We use Bovens’ (2005; 2007, p.450) conceptualization of public 
accountability as ‘a relationship between actor and a forum, in which an actor has an obligation 
to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement and 
the actor may face consequences’.  
 
In this paper we show that performance management regimes have a key role to play in how 
the public sector achieves accountability (Lee, 2008). The information they provide forms the 
basis of questioning, debate and judgement by forums and the need for reward or sanction 
provides a form of control, which distinguishes accountability from other relationships such as 
answerability or transparency (Smyth, 2012). Yet, control can only be exercised if good 
performance can be distinguished from bad (Meyer and Gupta, 1994). This may be difficult to 
achieve without a system of national standards, and independent assessment to monitor how 
an organization meets those standards. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, as part of the 
Public Sector Agreement’ system in the UK, there was an attempt to ensure overall coherence 
between government set targets at the national and local levels, a golden thread (Micheli and 
Neeley, 2010). This aimed to create delivery alignment with objectives, targets and indicators 
from central government through to local delivery. At the same time, ‘targets and indicators 
4 
 
are designed to control local delivery, improve accountability, compare organizations’ 
performance, and influence behaviour and action to improve public services’ (Micheli and 
Neely, 2010, p. 598). 
 
The golden thread ensures that there is a link between performance management at national 
and local levels. In addition, levels of hierarchical control evident in performance management 
regimes may indicate the extent to which the performance of accountees, can be scrutinized 
and judged by those with sufficient power to deliver rewards or sanctions based on that 
performance. The concepts of centralism and localism go some way to explaining the extent of 
hierarchical control, which itself is central to an understanding of public sector reforms by 
successive UK governments (Carter, 1989; Boyne, 1998; Brooks, 2000; Bowerman et al., 
2001; Sullivan, 2003; Peckham et al., 2005; Grubnic and Woods, 2009; Lowndes and Pratchett, 
2012; Ferry and Eckersley, 2015; Ferry et al., 2015).  
 
While accountability is needed to prevent the abuse of power, it is generally accepted that too 
much control, i.e. an excessive and overly bureaucratic focus on accountability, hinders 
entrepreneurship and, in turn, performance (Behn, 2001; Christensen and Laegreid, 2015; 
Halachmi, 2002; Bovens, 2005; Dubnick, 2005). Boyne (1998) discusses the problems of 
centralist structures in the public sector. Perceived problems include:  
 
•The monopolistic structure of public services in which a lack of competition provides no 
incentive for managers to innovate to survive. 
•A lack of unambiguous performance indicators. 
•The large size of bureaucracies, which can become inflexible and slow to respond.  
 
The response of successive governments to these perceived problems has often involved the 
delegation of autonomy, while retaining centralist elements of control. For instance, UK 
localism has meant devolving accountability for operational performance, while maintaining 
central control over financial performance (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015; Ferry et al., 2015; 
Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). In 2011, the Localism Act (HM Government 2011) was 
introduced with the ethos: ‘to try to do everything at the most local level’ (HOC, 2011, p. 12).  
 
Localism therefore aims to devolve power and resources away from central control, towards 
front-line managers, local democratic structures and local communities (Stoker, 2004). 
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However, accountability deficits can arise when governance systems do not sufficiently 
provide those in the public sector with requirements to account for their conduct and 
performance publicly, to accountability forums with the power to sanction them (Bovens et al., 
2008). Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) argue that accountability deficits can be avoided by 
focusing on constraints that serve to secure and maintain the key purposes of accountability in 
a democracy. They argue that decentralized control, i.e. ‘letting the managers manage’ has 
never been a credible alternative to centralized command and controls. Systems of localized 
authority and responsibility work well only when accompanied by other mechanisms of 
constraint.  
 
The mechanisms of constraint which allow accountability for performance to be achieved 
include a commitment to transparency and information sharing, a comprehensive system of 
performance assessment, and effective and honest communication between those who evaluate 
and assess performance and those being held to account (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). 
External auditors and independent inspectorates also play a prominent role in promoting 
accountability (Bovens, 2005; Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2015; Ellwood, 2014). Such 
agencies may collectively act as independent forums, and their relations with public sector 
agencies are based on the obligation of those agencies to explain and justify. In addition, the 
public can be provided with an independent assessment, which they can use to judge how the 
agency is performing. As Eckersley et al. (2014) note, performance management regimes 




The analysis and findings reported in this paper are based on a mixture of documentary analysis 
of publicly-available sources and élite interviews with key stakeholders involved in the 
performance management and accountability of UK FRSs (Yin, 2008). Policy documents were 
used to explain the changing nature of performance management regimes and accountability 
arrangements in England and Scotland. This analysis was supplemented by semi-structured 
interviews with senior stakeholders of both services. Interviewees included senior officers of 
both FRSs, along with senior members of bodies responsible for external oversight and scrutiny 
of the services. In Scotland, we interviewed members of Audit Scotland, the Scottish 
Improvement Service and HM Inspectorate. In England, we interviewed members of the 
6 
 
National Audit Office, the Local Government Association, DCLG and the Centre for Public 
Scrutiny.  
 
The interviews complemented other evidence in identifying an actor-level perspective of both 
how the changing performance management regimes were working and in determining their 
implications with respect to accountability. The perceptions of these actors are considered 
important given their role in implementing, designing and participating in their respective 
systems of performance management and accountability. Prior to interviews, the interviewees 
were provided with a list of themes that would be covered during the interviews.  
 
Organizational and historical context: UK Fire and Rescue Service 
A National Fire Service (NFS) was in existence in the UK from 1941 until the Fire Services 
Act 1947 when the fire-fighting functions of the NFS were transferred to local fire brigades, 
maintained by the councils of counties and county boroughs. The 1947 Act placed a duty on 
fire authorities to ‘to make provision for fire-fighting purposes and to make arrangements for 
rendering mutual assistance to other authorities for dealing with fires’ (ODPM 2003, p. 14). 
Authorities were required to provide advice (upon request) in relation to buildings and other 
property and fire authorities could use the brigades and equipment to respond to other incidents. 
 
Statutory requirements have changed over time as the fire service has needed to respond to 
changing patterns of risk. The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, together with the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004, replaced the policies, practices, institutions and arrangements that had 
been established by the 1947 Fire Services Act, the 1920 Emergency Powers, and 1948 Civil 
Defence Acts (Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2018). The fire service became the ‘Fire and Rescue 
Service’ (FRS) and its role changed from merely responding to incidents and protecting 
property, to the reduction of risk to communities and individuals. The 2004 Act acknowledged 
and embraced the wider functions undertaken by the service since its inception. The range of 
duties presently performed by FRSs across the UK include: 
 
•Responding to fires, road traffic accidents and other emergencies. 
•Carrying out safety inspections of business premises. 
•Undertaking preventative activities to reduce the risks of fire. 
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•Contributing to national resilience, and collectively being able to respond to up to four 
simultaneous national-level emergencies (NAO, 2015). 
  
In England, there are currently 46 Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs) and in Scotland (up until 
2013), there were eight FRSs which merged into one national FRS. The service in both 
countries is staffed by firefighters employed on both a full-time, retained (on-call/part-time) 
and volunteer basis. The service also has control room operatives and is supported by the usual 
back office functions.  
Despite reforms in public services in each country, both English and Scottish FRSs have 
embraced the move from a reactive service to a greater emphasis on prevention and protection. 
Since 2005, there has been a move away from prescriptive standards of fire cover determined 
centrally, towards integrated risk management planning (IRMP), at the level of individual fire 
services. IRMP requires each service to prioritize its resources based on a systematic 
assessment of the risks to life and property in its area. Its aim is to recognize the relationship 
between risks and resources, and to use this information as a planning tool to ensure consistent 
service delivery. It recognizes the critical role of prevention, i.e. to develop local resilience 
against risks that can be foreseen. IRMP, the retained firefighters’ system, and community 
safety initiatives have been retained in English FRSs, despite recent reforms. To this extent 
these characteristics of the service have been common to both England and Scotland after 2005. 
 
Despite the local focus of IRMP, in Scotland a review in 2010 recommended the development 
of a complementary national/regional IRMP to enable economies of scale, collaboration and 
sharing of services such as human resources, IT and fire investigation (Scottish Fire and Rescue 
Advisory Unit, 2010). The Scottish reforms together with parallel reforms in England and, in 
particular, their implications for performance management, service delivery and accountability 
are discussed below.  
 
Findings and discussion 
Changing performance and accountability arrangements in English FRSs 2010–2016 
The broader context of austerity (see Bracci et al., 2015) provides the backdrop to key reforms 
that have fundamentally affected how English FRSs have been structured and governed since 
2010. The Open Public Services white paper (Cabinet Office, 2011), the Localism Act (HM 
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Government, 2011) and Local Audit and Accountability Act (DCLG, 2014) set out the policy 
agenda of the Coalition government with respect to public sector reform. These reforms aimed 
to create a more diverse market in public services, and a greater role for private sector 
companies in service delivery (Eckersley et al., 2014). There was significant decentralization 
of control (or localism, see Stoker, 2004) to challenge bureaucracy: ‘Decades of top-down 
prescription and centralization have put bureaucratic imperatives above the needs of service 
users’ (Cabinet Office, 2011, p. 7). FRSs, though not mentioned specifically in the white paper, 
became commissioned services; with the FRAs as the commissioners and the FRSs as service 
providers (Murphy and Ferry, 2017). Localism aimed to decentralize power and decision-
making to the lowest possible level (Stoker, 2004). A Fire Futures report on localism and 
accountability (De Savage, 2010) discusses the priorities of FRSs and the need to eliminate 
central targets, central control mechanisms and empower local communities. The role of central 
government was to be limited to the elimination of anything which constrains local freedom, 
including reporting requirements and inspection.  
 
Responsibilities to report to central government were reduced to financial reporting 
requirements under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, which had facilitated the 
closure of the Audit Commission. It became the role of the National Audit Office (NAO) to 
provide central government with value-for-money reports, limited to the financial 
sustainability of the service (see NAO, 2015) and to oversee arrangements for the audit of local 
public bodies, such as FRSs. As noted by Ferry and Eckersley (2015), local government 
services, including FRSs, would be assessed on financial conformance alone, with limited 
central provision for monitoring outputs or operational performance. As such, there was also 
limited scope for performance information to assure public accountability (see also Kloot, 
2009).  
 
Performance management regimes underpin accountability by providing a mechanism that 
enables service providers to be held accountable by forums (Behn, 2003). Prior to 2010, 
performance management regimes within FRSs involved comprehensive national frameworks, 
performance indicators and assessments (see Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2013) ensuring 
consistency between national policy and local delivery and enabling the establishment of a 
golden thread (Micheli and Neely, 2010). These whole organization assessments (WOAs) 
(Martin et al., 2016) covered operational performance and emergency preparedness alongside 
financial management. Key performance indicators and standards were a prominent feature of 
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assessments to evaluate the performance of locally-delivered services. They also provided 
benchmarks for other FRSs and provided a motivational tool to facilitate continuous 
improvement and learning (Bovens, 2005, Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). However, since the 
introduction of localism in 2010, there has been a move away from the use of nationally-
imposed indicators and standards to assess local operational performance. As one interviewee 
noted: 
 
…so whereas previously we used to have national standards of fire cover, with the 
introduction of local risk planning, services were released from the requirement to 
conform to national standards (senior manager in an English FRA). 
 
As such, a new National Framework (DCLG, 2012) focused on high-level responsibilities of 
both the government and FRSs, but it did not ‘prescribe operational matters’:  
The National Framework will continue to provide an overall strategic direction 
to fire and rescue authorities but will not seek to tell them how to serve their 
communities. They are free to operate in a way that enables the most efficient 
delivery of their services…Ultimately, it is to the local communities, not 
government, that fire and rescue authorities are accountable (DCLG, 2012, p. 6). 
 
Thus, while the National Framework provided some strategic direction, it did not provide any 
nationally-imposed key performance indicators to enable the assurance of accountability for 
performance at the local level. Effectively, the ability to create a golden thread between 
national policy and local delivery was severed, as one interviewee noted: 
 
I don’t think it’s as good as it used to be because all of the national PIs have been 
side-lined. When you’ve got a team in DCLG or in government bringing together 
all the information and statistics to share back out to the 46 services, that was a 
better arrangement, but again it’s not part of the government’s policy. It’s down to 
you decide what you’ve got which puts more onus back on the individual services. 





The model for assessing operational performance at the local level (to fit the vision of localism) 
was ‘sector-led improvement’. It was proposed that the sector-led framework (designed by the 
Local Government Association and Chief Fire Officers Association), would underpin local 
accountability by giving forums (for example citizens) the tools and information to hold local 
fire services to account in terms of both delivery of outcomes and value for money (De Savage, 
2010, LGA, 2014). The tools for sector-led improvement were an operational assessment 
(OpA) and a fire peer challenge (FPC). The FPC process complemented the FRSs’ own 
performance assessment (using OpA) by providing assessment and feedback (from peers 
within the sector) on how the service could improve. However, our interviewees questioned 
the effectiveness of performance assessment led by the sector: 
I suppose the problem with peer assessment and the sort of friendly in-house touch 
is, is it challenging enough and is it pushing things as far as it might? It’s not quite 
the same level of external scrutiny and it’s a much friendlier sort of process… does 
that mean it’s too cosy and a bit too easy? Should there be a bit more challenge and 
scrutiny? (senior manager in an English FRA.) 
…we can’t be trusted as a fire sector to quality assure ourselves and provide 
assurance back to the government. We’ve proved that because we haven’t been brutal 
enough with ourselves, I don’t think…I think it needs to be, there needs to be some 
form of assurance and a real decent assessment with teeth that makes services 
improve, if not, sanctions will be put in place (senior manager of an English FRS). 
 
 
Research by Downe et al. (2017) found that although the service engages positively with 
sector-led improvement, its effectiveness is too heavily reliant on the integrity of the sector to 
undertake accurate and robust assessments. This means that the quality of the information upon 
which accountability forums (for example citizens, local government) are able to make 
judgements and evaluations is questionable. Performance assessed by the sector may be less 
objective than the scrutiny of an external inspectorate. As one interviewee noted; ‘Trust is 
good, ruthless supervision is better, and at the moment, peer review doesn’t provide ruthless 
supervision’. If integrity of performance assessment is open to challenge, the ability of forums 
to impose sanctions for poor performance is limited, as it may be more difficult to identify. In 
addition to the problem of quality, the data has not even been available for scrutiny, as although 
the OpA and FPC have been undertaken by all 46 FRSs, the reports were removed from the 
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Local Government Association (LGA) website in 2015 and were not available on all local 
authority websites (Murphy and Ferry, 2017).  
 
One interviewee explained that the process of sector-led improvement has, to some extent, 
‘been its own worst enemy’:  
 
…certainly, the analysis of how services are performed, release of reports, 
availability of data and opportunities for improvement, identification of where 
service practice could be improved…I don’t think that’s been particularly 
strong…The perception is, and I think it’s probably fair, that it’s almost seen as 
the sector marking its own homework, I think some of that’s perception, and I 
think because the outcomes and the outputs from the review process are not 
clearly defined and they’re not well shared (Home Office manager). 
 
Performance management regimes based on localism do not necessarily need to result in 
accountability deficits (Bovens et al., 2008) if there are adequate constraints in place to prevent 
it (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). National monitoring and inspectorate powers can provide 
such constraint, as they are (when properly established and conducted) impartial performance 
assessments carried out by those with expertise. Moreover, as such performance assessments 
are carried out by objective agents (unlike the sector-led assessments identified above), the 
accuracy of the data and information can be relied upon by citizens who may not be sufficiently 
qualified (or motivated) to carry out ‘armchair audits’ (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015).  
 
In the English FRSs, national monitoring and inspection disappeared in 2007 when Her 
Majesty’s Independent Fire Inspectorate was decommissioned, making England the only 
country in Europe without a dedicated inspectorate (Murphy and Ferry, 2017). While the 
independent inspectorate was retained in Scotland, it was replaced by the Chief Fire Service 
Adviser (CFSA) in England. The CFSA is a civil service role accountable to the relevant 
ministerial department (the DCLG 2010–2015 and the Home Office from 2016) and obliged to 
provide strategic advice and guidance to the government on the structure, organization and 
performance of FRAs and FRSs (Murphy and Ferry, 2017). However, this role was not 
independent and there were no reporting requirements to Parliament or to the public. As a 
deputy chief executive of an English FRA noted: ‘It’s not particularly a beefed-up role. It’s 
quite light-touch’. It is questionable whether the presence of the CFSA has provided sufficient 
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assurance to enable accountability for performance, as it did not result in independent 
assessments that could be accessed and scrutinized by the public. Indeed, NAO senior 
management admitted that:  
 
…the major driver of service improvement and/or efficiency…has been austerity. 
People will not be inefficient as they have not got the cash…this principle has 
replaced any sort of centralized inspection [this has left] an assurance hole in 
relation to fire.  
 
Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) note, independent oversight should not be viewed as 
‘bureaucratic overload’ but as a necessary long-term investment in good governance to prevent 
accountability deficits. The NAO conclusion on value for money in England in 2015 was: 
 
To ensure the continued financial and service sustainability of the sector in the 
context of ongoing funding reductions, we would expect the Department to have a 
fuller understanding of the appropriate funding level necessary to support 
services. Equally it should oversee an accountability system capable of providing 
robust assurance that authorities are maintaining service standards and 
delivering value for money locally. The Department needs to improve on both 
criteria to ensure that it is well-placed to deliver value for money in the future. In 
particular, it has weak assurance over the effectiveness of the local accountability 
system for fire and rescue, and this needs to be strengthened (NAO, 2015, p. 10). 
 
 
Changing performance and accountability arrangements in the Scottish FRS 2010–2016 
Following devolution, the transfer of responsibility for fire and rescue gradually moved from 
Westminster to the Scottish Executive (Taylor et al., 2017). Although Scotland is still regulated 
by UK-wide legislation such as the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the country now enacts its 
own legislation on the delivery of most public services, including its FRS (Mackie, 2013). 
Despite also being subject to ‘austerity’ (Blyth, 2015; O’Hara, 2015; Schui, 2014), Scotland 
has taken a very different approach to its public service design and delivery than that adopted 
by England. By 2015, the new governance structure in Scotland was very different to England 
and despite a significant transition, clear demonstrable improvement was being achieved in 
terms of both operational performance and efficiency savings (Audit Scotland, 2015, 2018).  
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Like the rest of the Scottish public sector, fire and rescue has undergone significant institutional 
reform (Christie Commission, 2011, Scottish Government, 2011, Mackie, 2013). The structure 
of eight separate FRAs had resulted in considerable duplication and significant unwarranted 
variation in the provision of services. In 2013, the eight services were reorganized into a single 
national body, the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS). A centrally imposed framework 
of national performance targets based on outcome objectives, measures and indicators was 
developed (Scottish Government, 2016). Unlike England, these performance targets were 
designed to assess local operational performance. 
 
The new SFRS brought with it a new ‘landscape’ for structures of governance (Scottish 
Government, 2013). New governance and accountability arrangements were set out in the 
‘Governance and Accountability Framework Document’ (Scottish Government, 2013a). Public 
sector governance arrangements generally involve accountability mechanisms relative to the 
stated goals of the sector, for example effective service outcomes as in the case of the SFRS. It 
also usually includes the structures that clarify the responsibilities of the various stakeholders 
to the organization, and the tools that could be used to assure accountability both internally and 
externally (Annisette, et al., 2013). The new accountability framework included the roles and 
responsibilities of ministers in the Scottish Government, the SFRS chair, board and chief 
officer. It demands good conduct from those in authority to meet the stated objectives of the 
SFRS. For instance, the chief fire officer must ensure ‘robust performance and risk 
management arrangements…to support the achievement of the SFRS’s aims and objectives 
and that facilitate comprehensive reporting to the board, the Scottish Government and the wider 
public’ (Scottish Government, 2013a, p. 6).  
 
The fire and rescue framework sets out ‘expectations and strategic priorities for the SFRS’ and 
the SFRS develops its strategic plan to show how it proposes to deliver against these priorities 
(2013, p.14). A manager in Audit Scotland asserted that ‘the fire framework sets the exam 
question and the strategic plan is then the answer to the question’. The potential to create a 
golden thread between national policy and local delivery was therefore (unlike in England) 
maintained and strengthened. 
 
Comprehensive reporting refers to transparency which is a key mechanism for ensuring 
effective accountability by providing the openness needed to, amongst other things, prevent 
the abuse of power (Bovens, 2005). The SFRS has a statutory duty to provide the public as 
14 
 
well as national and local government with access to its proceedings, papers and reports. 
However, as in England, transparency is not adequate by itself to provide accountability 
(Bovens, 2005).  
 
A key part of this paper is the arrangements that determine the performance assessment of 
FRSs in Scotland and England. Such arrangements provide the tools needed to assure the public 
accountability of the SFRS. Unlike England, accountability for performance has been 
reinforced by the re-establishment of an independent fire and rescue service inspectorate. The 
SFRS is subject to scrutiny and oversight at the national level, of both its financial and 
operational performance. This is achieved by several external bodies, namely the Scottish 
Improvement Service, Audit Scotland and HM Fire Inspectorate in Scotland, and encompasses 
the wider performance perspective needed for public audit (Elwood, 2014). Audit Scotland has 
the powers to examine value for money and financial performance. In addition, Her Majesty’s 
Chief Fire Service Inspector in Scotland (HMCFSIS) oversees operational inspection of the 
SFRS, including community safety engagement, staff learning and development, and policies 
and practices. This amount of direct scrutiny was in stark contrast to their previous experiences: 
 
 
…pretty much from day one all of a sudden the Senior Management of the new 
Fire Service found themselves exposed to a level of challenge they’d never had 
in their career before…it’s absolutely massively ratcheted up and to a certain 
extent in the early days for the first year they gave non-executive Board 
members, of whom there are 12, additional days because they thought, ‘Get it 
started, it’s going to need to be a lot of input’ (manager, Audit Scotland). 
 
The amount of scrutiny is not only due to the number of bodies overseeing the service but also 
due to the differing and overlapping natures of the scrutiny. While the SFRS is directly 
accountable to the Scottish Government, under the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 
2012, the SFRS is required, ‘to make arrangements for local fire and rescue services’. This 
includes ‘establishing a formal statutory relationship with each local authority’ and providing 
adequate arrangements, ‘for the involvement of the local authority in determining priorities and 
objectives for SFRS locally’. This enables the service to work with local authorities to tackle 
local, risk-based priorities. There are 32 local authorities in Scotland. This means that the SFRS 
has 32 local delivery plans and 32 scrutiny committees. Despite this apparent bureaucracy and 
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complexity, interviewees agreed that the new arrangements had strengthened local 
engagement:  
 
…there’s more of a focus now than we had in the past because under the joint board 
arrangements they used to have in [some] areas, the joint board were very distant 
from the councils and scrutiny took place at the board level and there was very-
very little local engagement with the service. I think the current arrangements have 
actually strengthened local engagement, because you now have a local plan for 
each of the 32 areas of Scotland and each area has a local senior officer from the 
service (manager, Scottish Improvement Service] 
 
This shows that while the single service (accountable to the Scottish Parliament through the 
fire and rescue framework) is centralized, the day-to-day approach taken exhibits 
characteristics of localism (see Stoker, 2004). One interviewee explained the approach taken 
in Scotland as opposed to England; 
 
…whereas in England it is localism and Scotland appears to be centralization, it’s 
actually not centralization. It’s centralization in direction and administration but 
creating greater local connection. It’s empowering people to be able to think for 
themselves and that’s a cultural shift, whereas everything before was deferred up, 
people are now starting to get a wee bit more comfortable in supporting local needs 
(senior officer, SFRS). 
 
The interpretation of localism in Scotland seems to mean that the SFRS engages with the needs 
of its local communities while still being subject to national targets and scrutiny. Unlike in 
England, the Scottish experience of localism does not mean that the SFRS is no longer 
accountable to government for the performance of its locally-delivered services. The 
framework for SFRS (Scottish Government, 2013) sets out strategic priorities and objectives. 
These cover three key areas; improving service outcomes; equal access to specialist services 
and stronger engagement with communities. As in England, it mirrors the shift in emphasis 
from property to people and from response to prevention. However, unlike England, the 
framework is used by the Scottish Government to hold the SFRS to account for performance 
against operational as well as financial targets. As detailed within the fire and rescue framework 
and the SFRS’s planning and performance management framework (SFRS, 2014), targets 
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include, reducing fire fatalities and causalities, reducing special service fatalities and casualties, 
reducing accidental dwelling fires, reducing the number of non-domestic fires and reducing 
firefighter injuries.  
 
In contrast to England, there is no need for ‘armchair auditors’ as mechanisms to assure public 
accountability have not been replaced by raw data. The existence of nationally-imposed targets 
and inspection powers provides performance information and assessment that is an adequate 
basis for the evaluation and judgement of the SFRS by forums (including citizens and local 
government). The objective assessment of performance by independent and external bodies 
including HMCFSIS ensures that performance standards are met, providing those using such 
information with trust in its accuracy and completeness. The first key message from Audit 
Scotland’s review of the new service in 2015 stated:  
 
The Scottish Government and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service managed the 
2013 merger of the eight fire and rescue services effectively. The Scottish 
Government clearly defined roles, expectations and initial targets for the chair and 
chief officer, and the merger followed good practice. There was no impact on the 
public during the merger and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service's performance 
is improving (Audit Scotland, 2015, p. 5) 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has explained how performance management regimes within UK FRSs changed 
between 2010 and 2016. We show how such regimes can be used as a basis for evaluating the 
level of public accountability that exists in public services. It does so by contributing to limited 
empirical evidence of such arrangements within the FRSs. In particular, illustrating the 
accountability implications of divergent approaches to performance management regimes in 
England and Scotland in recent years. We found that, in England, the regime based on localism 
(for operational performance) and centralism (for financial performance) relied heavily on the 
integrity and professionalism of the sector. This is not necessarily problematic in terms of 
accountability, if there had been arrangements to assure accountability for operational 
performance. However, in the study period there was an absence of constraints to prevent 
accountability deficits. Due to the interpretation and execution of localism in England, there 
were no nationally-imposed targets and indicators to which English FRSs at the local level 
were held accountable for meeting. This resulted in severing the ability to create a golden thread 
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between national policy and local delivery. In addition, the ability to ensure consistent service 
delivery across FRSs was also lost. 
 
Transparency in the form of raw data (for example peer review reports) was not considered to 
be an adequate substitute for accountability, especially given that such data was no longer 
accessible. There were accountability deficits as there was no independent external forum of 
oversight to pass judgement on the performance of the FRS and thus a limited basis on which 
individual FRS could face consequences for poor performance. This may change following the 
establishment of the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services 
(HMICFRS). HMICFRS is an extension of the inspectorate for police forces. Its establishment 
partially reflects the findings of a 2015 NAO report on the financial sustainability of the 
service: 
The fire sector is different from other emergency services in not having an 
external inspectorate. The Department relies on local scrutiny (from peers 
within the sector, elected councillors, and the general public) to safeguard 
service standards, governance, and value for money of each authority. While 
this is in keeping with its policy of localism, the Department has not 
attempted to test the effectiveness of the local systems to which it has 
delegated accountability. There are shortcomings in some of these local 
arrangements; for example, some authorities think that peer challenges are 
not always rigorous and independent. (NAO 2015, p.12) 
 
It remains to be seen whether or not the establishment of the HMICFRS will improve 
accountability for performance and reassure the public and other agencies that the FRSs remain 
accountable to the communities they serve. Moreover, in 2018 the Home Office (which has 
been responsible for FRSs since 2016) stated that: 
 
The National Framework will continue to provide an overall strategic 
direction to fire and rescue authorities, but Whitehall will not run fire, and 
fire and rescue authorities and their services remain free to operate in a 
way that enables the most efficient and effective delivery of their services. 




While this suggests a continuation of previous policy as discussed in this paper, an indepth 
evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
In Scotland, the performance regime and thus accountability for performance arrangements 
have been quite different. Unlike in England, there are centrally imposed targets for 
performance. In addition, there is a proliferation of independent monitoring to assure 
accountability for both operational and financial performance. Based on current arrangements, 
there is ample opportunity for posing questions and passing judgement on the performance of 
the SFRS. As such our research indicates that, in contrast to England, the arrangements to 
assure public accountability are much stronger in Scotland as there are clear constraints to limit 
accountability deficits.  
 
Our findings illustrate that independent scrutiny and oversight of performance management 
regimes is essential in assuring accountability. In addition, they highlight the necessity for a 
coherent strategic direction at government, i.e. ‘central’ level. In England the interpretation and 
enactment of localism, with empowerment at the local level and lack of external scrutiny, has 
failed to provide adequate assurance of accountability. Ironically, Scotland’s more centralized 
approach, which the English Coalition government shunned as being too bureaucratic (Cabinet 
Office, 2010), appears to have enabled local priorities to have been tackled. We therefore show 
that, while some research suggests that centralization can be a bad thing (for example see 
Grubnic and Woods, 2009), it can also empower local communities when supported by 
mechanisms to ensure that services are listening to those communities. 
 
As this research covers the period between 2010 and 2016, we acknowledge that an obvious 
limitation of the research is that public policy has moved on. However, we do not believe that 
this necessarily detracts from the broader implications and insights that differing levels of 
control over performance management regimes may have for public accountability in general. 
Nevertheless, future research may wish to assess whether or not the introduction of HMICFRS 
in England is likely to lead to improved public accountability. In Scotland, while levels of 
independent scrutiny provide superior public accountability, future research may, nevertheless, 
wish to consider whether there is too much scrutiny, which could, if it becomes burdensome, 
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